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ABSTRACT Contemporary jihad is the lineal descendant of classical jihad theory as
modified by contemporary radical Islam. It has expressions in both Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam,
but differs from the classical material in that the targets allowable for jihad are not states
but smaller groups or even individuals. The article traces the history of this development.
Classical Jihad Theory
Classical Muslim jihad theory is based upon a combination of Qur’anic selections,
hadiths (traditions ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad), legal discussions based
upon the hadith literature and formal treatises dealing with jihad. Each one of
these components has its place. The Qur’anic materials are related to the experi-
ences of Muhammad and the first Muslim community, who after the immigration
to Medina (the hijra, 622), needed to establish themselves in the oasis town. Most
of the major battles that Muhammad and the Muslims fought during the eight
years following the hijra are alluded to in the Qur’an, with extensive discussion of
tactics, the theological importance of these battles, questions of the reward of
martyrs and other issues. Because not all of these battles were victories for the
Muslim community, it is possible to find coverage for military outcomes ranging
from defeat to stalemate to Pyrrhic victory to outright victory.
And yet the word ‘jihad’, so emblematic of later Muslim warfare, only occurs
with a military significance rarely inside the Qur’an.1 While the warfare carried
out by the Prophet Muhammad and the Muslims has all the hallmarks of what
would later be called ‘jihad’ – warfare with divine sanction – it is to the great
Muslim conquests that followed 634, and changed the face of the Middle East and
North Africa irrevocably, that we must turn for the crystallisation of jihad. It is
from this period lasting until approximately 740 that we begin to find the
mythology of jihad develop. Because the materials were not written down for a
further 50–100 years afterwards, we have to reconstruct the development of this
mythology – primarily on the basis of the hadith literature (mostly written down
during the ninth century mostly) and the jihad literature.
The hadith literature is vast, but most collections, and certainly the primary ones
(the so-called ‘canonical’ collections), contain a section on jihad. These selections
consist of sayings ascribed to Muhammad enjoining jihad and declaring its limita-
tions, and pseudo-historical snippets from his battles or battlefield injunctions
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liberally intermixed with passages from the Qur’an relevant to the subject. Strictly
speaking, the materials in the hadith literature are not sufficient for a comprehen-
sive development of doctrine on the subject, but they are enough to provide the
jurisprudents who organised them, starting in the later ninth century and
continuing on until modern times, with material. As is usual with the hadith
literature, some of the traditions are useful as concise statements for fighters or as
slogans, but many of them are either irrelevant or too lengthy for practical use.
For this reason it is easy to see why the jihad literature developed alongside the
hadith materials. The Kitab al-jihad of ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak (d. 797) is the
earliest example of this literature, and the first definitive time when the word
‘jihad’ is used in its popular Muslim connotation.2 It contains hundreds of
sayings, tactical advice, descriptions of martyrs’ rewards and slogans that are very
useful on the battlefield. Appropriately, none of these are particularly long, and
most are quite clear and to the point. Ibn al-Mubarak was himself a volunteer
fighter, and utilised the spiritual and political prestige he gained by fighting the
Byzantines (almost single-handedly) to embarrass the ‘Abbasid government into
following him. Essentially, Ibn al-Mubarak was one of the first Muslims who was
able to use the title of ‘defender of Islam’ to challenge the establishment – a
paradigm copied today by radical Muslims. Later jihad literature flourished at the
time of the Crusades and a number of the authors prominent at that time, such as
al-Sulami (d. 1261)3 and Ibn al-Nahhas al-Dumyati (d. 1411),4 followed in the
footsteps of Ibn al-Mubarak.
The legal literature of jihad is much more complicated than any of these first
three genres. First of all, like with the hadith literature, the legal literature of Sunni
Islam is vast and discussions on jihad constitute only one small part of it. Many of
the jurisprudents, however they disliked it, were effectively tailoring their
discussions on jihad to either regions (such as North Africa, where jihad against
the Christians of Spain was an ever-present reality, or India) or to dynasties such
as the ‘Abbasids, the Ayyubids or the Mamluks. Jihad, as expressed by the
jurisprudents, was a regulated type of warfare. It had to have the sanction of the
imam (or caliph), who was the representative of God, and be for a specific
purpose. According to the jurisprudents, jihad is a process that begins with the
summoning of the enemy to Islam, and either leads to Muslim victory, in which
case the enemy is either killed, enslaved or accepts the protection (dhimma) of the
Muslims, or to a tactical ceasefire (hudna). There is little discussion as to what
Muslims should do in case of an outright or catastrophic defeat.
Jihad is divided into three categories according to these classical formulations:
jihad of the hand (or the sword), which was military in nature; jihad of the
tongue, which involved the reproof of an unjust ruler or corrupt society; and jihad
of the soul, developed mostly by the Sufis, that involved waging an internal
struggle against one’s lower soul. For the jurisprudents, there was extensive
discussion concerning the jihad of the hand, which was described as being incum-
bent upon part of the community at all times (for offensive attacks), but upon the
whole community at others (when it was defensive). However, the jihad of the
tongue was problematic because of the fact that it could be used as a device
against elites, and was part and parcel of the activist doctrine of al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf
wa-l-nahi ‘an al-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil).5 Both jihad of
the tongue and jihad of the soul were comparatively unimportant in the classical
period. While one finds examples of them in the literature, discussions concern-
ing them were peripheral to the Muslim community overall.6
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Probably the most difficult discussion that exercised the classical Muslim
jurisprudents was the question of who was a legitimate target in jihad. At first,
the lines were clear. Enemy combatants (non-Muslims) were legitimate; non-
Muslim non-combatants (women, children, elderly, monks and religious figures)
were not. However, quickly jihad began to be utilised by Sunnis, especially
against Muslim communities who were outside the mainstream, such as Shi‘ites
and Kharijites, and later others. For this reason, the term ‘jihad’ became expanded
immensely by the middle of the classical period (eighth to fifteenth centuries),
and it was not unusual during a ‘jihad’ to find Muslims fighting together with
non-Muslims against other Muslims.
The Shi‘ite experience was quite different. Supporting as they do the rights of
the Prophet Muhammad’s family to rule the Muslim community, Shi‘ites histori-
cally were compelled to fight in order to obtain these rights. Because Shi‘ites have
always been a minority among the Sunni masses, they have not always partici-
pated in jihad against non-Muslims, but have instead themselves been the targets
of Sunni jihads. This trend began with the paradigmatic Shi‘ite martyr, the
Prophet Muhammad’s grandson al-Husayn (killed 680). Al-Husayn was killed at
Karbala’ in southern Iraq, while leading a small group of his immediate family
and supporters, by troops who supported the Umayyad government. This tragic
scene was duplicated dozens of times during the early Muslim period, as
members of the Prophet Muhammad’s family and their supporters attempted to
revolt against and seize power from the Sunni governments. While Sunni jihad
theory emphasises the triumphal process of conquest from non-Muslims in which
martyrs either gain victory or paradise, Shi‘ites emphasise the tragic and mourn-
ful quality of perpetual (but noble) defeat. Sunni jihad harks back to the Prophet
Muhammad’s ultimately successful conquest of Mecca in 630 and the founding of
the Muslim community, while Shi‘ite jihad commemorates the unjust slaughter of
Muhammad’s descendents and looks forward to the time when the Mahdi (the
Muslim messianic figure) can take vengeance for these wrongs and establish a
righteous state.7
Contemporary Mainstream Jihad
For the most part jihad theory fell fallow after the great anti-colonialist jihads of
the nineteeth century (although in isolated places such as Somalia these contin-
ued on into the twentieth century). The ideology which won independence for the
Muslim world from European colonialism was not that of jihad, but rather
usually some mixture of nationalism and socialism. Occasionally there were reli-
gious figures who participated in these struggles, such as the proto-Palestinian
(although Syrian by birth) ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam (d. 1936)8 and the Algerian
‘Abbas Madani,9 but these were few and far between. Elites within the Muslim
world either crushed political Islam (mainly in the form of the Muslim Brother-
hood) during the 1940s and 1950s or in some cases co-opted it.
However, with successive defeats by Israel that destroyed the legitimacy of
secular nationalistic regimes during the 1960s, jihad theory began to be revived.
In its most mainstream form, this meant publications of fatwas (legal opinions) by
respected religious figures and institutions (such as al-Azhar in Cairo) declaring
that fighting Israel was indeed a legitimate jihad. However, there were some
problems with these proclamations. First of all, in general Muslim governments
did like to have jihad-style rhetoric used extensively, if only because many of the
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elites were influenced either by socialism or other Western ideologies or because
they were not Muslim (usually Christian). Second, jihad rhetoric gave very little
room to negotiate in warfare. The style of warfare promoted in Sunni jihad was a
‘victory or martyrdom’ warfare, which was not the style of a secular government,
and did not allow for the use of specifically Islamic tactics derived from the
classical religious literature.
However, this fact does not mean that mainstream Sunnis have avoided discus-
sion of jihad during the period following 1970. Although they were (unjustly, in
my opinion) accused by radical Muslims of ignoring jihad,10 prominent religious
figures such as Mahmud Shakir (Syrian),11 Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza (Palestin-
ian),12 Hasan Ayyub (Egyptian),13 Dr Muhammad Ramadan Sa‘id al-Buti
(Syrian),14 Muhammad Matawalli Sha‘rawi15 and Dr Salah Basayuni Rislan
(Egyptian)16 and others wrote on jihad. However, while many of these writers
were concerned with the issue of jihad against Israel, especially by the Palestin-
ians, they are all characterised by attempts to limit jihad in some way, and in that
way to follow the classical jihad heritage. Jihad for them is a form of warfare that
is ordained by religious authority, most specifically the ‘ulama (in lieu of a caliph)
and can only be waged against external enemies such as the Israelis.
The above tracts, however distinguished their authors might be, are usually not
very comprehensive. This is not the case with regard to Muhammad Khayr
Haykal’s 1993 treatise al-Jihad wa-l-qital fi al-siyasa al-shara‘iyya,17 which gives a
complete treatment of the subject and considers a number of unusual contempo-
rary problems not mentioned by previous writers. These include the question of
women fighting in jihad, the use of weapons of mass destruction in jihad, and the
issue of when jihad is forbidden or what to do when the Muslims lose a jihad.
Haykal is moderate in his opinions, and gives a balanced sense of what the
classical and contemporary legal opinion is on each topic.
Following the rise of radical Islam as an intellectual force in the 1980s and
especially the 1990s, more of the mainstream ‘ulama wrote against the excesses of
their methods of fighting. However, it is still possible to discern mainstream
support for extreme tactics against Israel and in some cases against India (by
Pakistani ‘ulama). Probably the most obvious example of this support is the ques-
tion of the use of suicide attacks. Classical Muslim jihad theory did not allow for
the use of suicide attacks except when there was some type of benefit for the
Muslims. Even such a broad-ranging author as Ibn al-Nahhas al-Dumyati
(mentioned above) could not see such benefit, and indeed it is difficult to under-
stand what a suicide attack in the pre-modern world (prior to the discovery of
explosives) could accomplish that an ordinary military attack could not.
As we will note below, Shi‘ites used suicide attacks and suicidal mass wave
operations, but Sunnis until the middle of the 1990s did not. With the first suicide
attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israel in 1994 (reprisals for the Hebron
massacre of early 1994), these attacks became gradually morphed into ‘martyrdom
operations’. As a result of the initial popularity of the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2005),
martyrdom operations were embraced by many ‘ulama in the mainstream.
However, there were always those such as Hasan Ayyub (above), the Syrian Nasir
al-Din al-Albani and the Saudi Ibn ‘Uthaymin who rejected such attacks as being
nothing other than suicide or being detrimental to the image of Islam.18
After the attacks of 11 September 2001 many mainstream ‘ulama recanted their
general support for martyrdom operations, and while affirming their legitimacy
in attacks against Israel (because of the inferior position of the Palestinians), they
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tried to limit their use severely. This tendency is the dominant characteristic of the
contemporary mainstream Sunni Muslim ‘ulama position vis-à-vis jihad: it should
be regulated closely along the classical lines, it should be focused on an obvious
enemy (such as Israel) by consensus, and it should be presented to the outside
world in Marxist, liberationist terms, not in purely Islamic terms. All of these
characteristics are completely rejected by radical Muslims.
Anti-governmental Jihad
At the same time as mainstream Islam was rediscovering jihad, radical Muslims
outside the mainstream were as well. Radical Islam is an ill-defined movement
embracing Muslims who not only call for the restoration of shari‘a in society
(something that theoretically all Muslims support) but seek to radically reshape
both the shari‘a and the society. In general they are hostile to Sufism and to
governmentally-supported religious elites. Usually they embrace Western science
and technology, while of course strongly rejecting Western political hegemony
and cultural norms.
Although it is possible for some elements of radical Islam to support main-
stream calls for jihad, in general by the mid-1970s there was a strong consensus
among these groups that fighting must be on the basis of Islam, and nothing else.
This is best expressed by ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj’s treatise, al-Farida al-gha’iba: 
Muslim blood will be shed in order to realize this victory. Now it must be
asked whether this victory will benefit the interests of an Islamic State?
Or will this victory benefit the interests of infidel rule? It will mean the
strengthening of a state which rebels against the Laws of God … these
Rulers will take advantage of the nationalist ideas of these Muslims in
order to realize their un-Islamic aims … Fighting has to be done (only)
under the Banner of Islam and under Islamic Leadership.19
Because radical Muslim groups had defined the necessity of fighting solely for an
Islamic state, they had to first of all transform their countries into Muslim states.
This dilemma necessitated development of the jihad of the tongue, the jihad
against corrupt and tyrannical rulers. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s radical
Muslim theorists had already developed the idea that contemporary Muslim
societies were in a state of apostasy, and therefore that apparent Muslims could
be fought and killed in order to establish a shari‘a state. That willingness to label
apparent Muslims as infidels (takfir) separated radicals out from other more
mainstream Muslim groups.
Takfir proved to be a slippery slope for radical Muslims, as throughout the
1990s and the first decade of 2000 they began to globalise it more and more. In
practice this global takfir enabled radical Muslims to attack their societies and kill
apparent Muslims indiscriminately under the pretext that such attacks were
justified. Not surprisingly takfir proved to be very unpopular, and indiscriminate
attacks enabled otherwise embattled secular regimes in Algeria and Egypt to
demonise the radicals, and ultimately to marginalise them.
For the most part the anti-governmental jihad discussions are consumed with
the question of what are the legitimate targets of these groups. Most agree that the
governments and their leaders are apostate and are responsible for denying the
implementation of shari‘a within Muslim majority countries. But the fact is that,
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for the most part, these higher governmental officials are not easy targets for the
anti-governmental jihad, as they are protected by security forces. This fact raises
the question of whether the security forces (army, police, secret agencies, etc.) are
legitimate targets. Discussions concerning this question turn on whether the
security forces are volunteer or conscript, and in some cases whether they carry
out their tasks with genuine or substandard fervour. In general, the answer to
these questions has been that the security forces are indeed legitimate targets.20
Beyond the security forces are a whole range of other forces that prop up
secular regimes, including economic factors (trade and tourism, and in some
cases the oil industry) and cultural factors (entertainers who distract the masses
from Islam, writers who write books and articles that are sometimes against the
radical interpretation of Islam). Economic factors weigh heavily in a country such
as Egypt, which is dependent upon tourism for the livelihoods of many of its
people (directly and indirectly). And then there are the families of all of these
people – are they possible targets as well?21
And lastly there are true innocents, who by no stretch of the imagination can be
considered to be participants in any conflict. Probably the best known case of an
innocent being killed was the little girl Shayma’ ‘Abd al-Halim, who was killed
when the Egyptian Islamic Jihad tried to assassinate the prime minister ‘Atif Sidqi
in 1993. The prime minister escaped from this attempt unhurt, but a large number
of school-girls were injured and Shayma’ was killed. This case is paradigmatic of
a public relations disaster for radicals, as it raised the following question: if they
were trying to establish a just Muslim state, why did a little girl have to die? The
answer given at the time by Sayyid Salah, one of the leaders, that he was ‘sorry for
the death of this little girl, but the jihad must not cease’,22 is problematic because
of its cold-bloodedness. Ultimately, it was ‘mistakes’ like this one that caused the
anti-governmental jihad in Egypt to fail.
Apocalyptic Global Jihad
Concurrent with the development of anti-governmental jihad in Egypt, the jihad
against the USSR in Afghanistan was beginning. Although objectively speaking
the Arab and other Muslim volunteers mainly based in Peshawar (Pakistan) did
not contribute significantly to the ultimate victory of the mujahidin over the
communist regime (in 1992), the experience they lived through was transforma-
tive. Unlike all other wars (including the ones against Israel), the Afghan jihad
was (at least from the perception of the foreign mujahidin) a pan-Islamic one.
Muslims from all over the world participated in a victorious struggle against one
of the world’s two superpowers and defeated it, causing it to actually collapse a
few years later.
The architect of this pan-Islamic vision was ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, a Palestinian
radical who, despairing of progress in the struggle against Israel, had identified
the Afghan jihad as a place where fighters could gain experience. ‘Azzam’s goals
shifted over the years: at first he used slogans like ‘the road to al-Quds [Jerusa-
lem] leads through Kabul’,23 but gradually he began to see the possibilities for
the foundation of an actual Islamic state in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the
problems with the anti-governmental radicals above was the fact that they
lacked a geographic base. While in certain cases, like in Algeria or Lebanon, the
terrain favoured guerrilla groups, in others such as Egypt it was difficult for the
mujahidin to establish themselves. It goes without saying that virtually all
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governments were either hostile to the aspirations of anti-governmental mujahi-
din or could be pressured to curtail their support (in the case of the Sudan).
Thus, ‘Azzam recognised that the mujahidin needed a base, in Arabic al-Qa‘ida, in
order to thrive.
Such a base could only be established in a failed state and must have a militant
population made ready for perpetual jihad by a conflict against infidels.
Hence ‘Azzam began to preach a salvationist type of jihad during his later years
(1986–1989), in which the Muslim world would reconquer all of the territories that
were once Muslim.24 According to ‘Azzam, because of the exigencies of the present
situation the entire Muslim world is in a state of civilisational defensive jihad. This
means that it is incumbent upon each and every Muslim – male and female – to
participate in the jihad. ‘Azzam also stressed that every Muslim who does not fight
in the jihad is not a true Muslim. Just as with the issue of takfir mentioned above,
for ‘Azzam and other globalist apocalyptic mujahidin, waging jihad served as the
primary criterion for deciding whether one was or was not a Muslim.
When one looks at the list of territories that ‘Azzam said needed to be recon-
quered, including all of India, Central Asia, most of Russia, south-eastern Europe
(the Balkans), southern Italy and Spain, it is clear that this jihad would be large-
scale and lengthy, and would encompass much of the world. If such a war were to
be ignited it would be impossible for most Muslims to live peaceful lives, as their
homes would be either bases for attacks against the infidels or subject to attack
themselves.
This type of globalist apocalyptic jihad relies upon the perception that the
entire non-Muslim world is currently participating in a campaign of extermina-
tion against the Muslims. The most useful tradition supporting this idea is the
following: 
The Messenger of God said: The nations are about to flock against you
[the Muslims] from every horizon, just as hungry people flock to a kettle.
We said: O Messenger of God, will we be few on that day? He said: No,
you will be many as far as your number goes, but you will be scum, like
the scum of the flash-flood, since fear will be removed from the hearts of
your enemies, and weakness (wahn) will be placed in your hearts. We
said: O Messenger of God, what does the word wahn mean? He said: Love
of this world and fear of death.25
This tradition – known as the hadith of Thawban – affirms that Muhammad
prophesied the time when Muslims would be under attack by the entire world,
and yet still avoid jihad, and be afraid of death. For radical Muslims, and espe-
cially apocalyptic globalist jihadis, this tradition is key to legitimising their stance.
In general, al-Qa‘ida and its ideological allies have contributed to the following
methodology of jihad. First, they have taken tactics that mainstream Arab Muslim
religious thought had legitimised for the Palestinians and applied them to fight-
ing every foreign enemy (the USA, Russia, India, and others). Second, they have
made jihad the major criterion for deciding whether someone is a Muslim or not.
Third, they have made the distinction between defensive and offensive jihad
meaningless, to the point where if jihad were waged according to their
pronouncements it would be eternal.
Like their friends in the anti-governmental jihad camp, apocalyptic global jihadis
are in general quite lonely. They cannot count on the support of any government
184 D. Cook
(other than that of the Taliban in Afghanistan), and their use of indiscriminate
violence, especially suicide attacks, has made them odious to most of the Muslim
world. Although their general goals – the establishment of a shari‘a state and the
unification of the Muslim world under the rule of a caliph – command some passive
support, their methods have driven even this passive support down considerably
during the past years.
Changing Shi‘ite Conceptions of Jihad
As noted previously, Shi‘ites did not have the collective history of victory in jihad
that the Sunnis did. At the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1977–1979), in
general Shi‘ite discussion of jihad was limited. This fact changed dramatically
with the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, when Iran was forced to fight for its land
against what it perceived as a coalition of Arabs and Western countries. During
the initial stages of this war, dramatic tactics were required involving suicidal
human wave assaults against the Iraqi positions. Because of the heritage of
martyrdom inherent in Shi‘ism, these suicidal attacks were not ideologically
problematic.26
The rise of the Islamic Republic in Iran also was a stimulant for the appearance
of radical Shi‘ite groups in other places, such as Lebanon (Amal and Hizballah)
and Pakistan (Tehrik-i Ja‘fari). Hizballah was first pitted against Western armies
located in Beirut, and in order to expel them it used suicide attacks against the US
and French forces with great success.27 After 1983 Hizballah turned to the more
difficult local enemy, Israel, which was then occupying most of southern Leba-
non. Initially Hizballah used suicide attacks against Israel with the same level of
success previously achieved against the USA and France. However, gradually
through the 1980s a law of diminishing returns prevailed, as the Israelis were able
to develop tactics that made suicide attacks pointless. Virtually no Hizballah
suicide attacks are recorded after 1989 (with the exception of the one in Argentina
against a Jewish Centre in 1994).28
Hizballah and other Shi‘ite organisations in Pakistan, and then later in Iraq
(after 2003), have tended to use standard guerrilla tactics against their enemies,
and have carefully avoided the use of suicide attacks. This avoidance is most
obvious in Iraq and Pakistan, where Sunni radicals have carried out dozens (in
Pakistan) and hundreds (in Iraq) of suicide attacks against Shi‘ite civilians, and
desecrated their religious sanctities. But probably because of the hierarchical
nature of Shi‘ite Islam, there has been no movement to declare Sunni radicals infi-
dels (after the manner of the latter’s takfir mentioned above).29 Nor has there been
extensive development of new tactics of jihad among Shi‘ites. Again, this fact
probably has to do with the lack of an authority void in Shi‘ism which is the
principal problem of Sunni radicals. Thus, while Shi‘ite radicals have been much
more successful from a political point of view than their Sunni counterparts, they
have displayed little leadership in the field of jihad theory during the recent past.
Tactics and Strategy
Muslim radicals, especially Sunnis, have been at the forefront of the development
of new tactics and strategy for jihad during the past 30 years. If a common theme
can be discerned in all of these developments, it is the desire to develop tactics
that will win, will highlight the sacrifices that the mujahidin have and are making
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on behalf of the Muslim community, and will gain them the prestige they crave so
that they can transform their societies. However, finding a balance between these
different imperatives has proven to be difficult.
The major tactic used by radical Sunni Muslims is the suicide attack. Indeed,
while radical Sunni Muslims did not pioneer this tactic – even in the Muslim
world, where as we have seen it was associated with Hizballah and Shi‘ites – their
development of it and excessive usage of it has made it their signature style of
attack. Indeed, in arenas such as Iraq where there are multiple groups fighting,
with varied ideologies, only those groups who are anti-governmental jihadis
(employing takfir) or from the apocalyptic globalist jihadi camp use suicide
attacks. Other groups specialise in conventional guerrilla attack methods such as
sniper attacks, road-side bombings or even full-scale military attacks. For these,
even religious groups do not require legitimisation.
Suicide attacks or martyrdom operations are legitimised by using the analogy
of the legal category of ‘the single fighter who charges a larger number’ that
appears in the classical literature, and is approved as long as there is benefit in it
for the Muslims.30 Because this fighter is unlikely to survive such an attack,
contemporary fatwas state that martyrdom operations are legitimate. The ques-
tion of the innocents who will be killed in such attacks is dealt with by referring to
the majaniq (mangonels) which were used by the Prophet Muhammad against the
city of Ta’if in 630. Because the mangonel is a spring-loaded, rock-hurling instru-
ment that cannot discriminate between fighters and innocents as its payload
careens down into a city or fortress, it is held that explosions are also legitimate,
even though one cannot know who will be killed as a result of them.
Additionally, both anti-governmental jihadis and globalists have vastly
changed the definition of a legitimate target. While classical jihad theory empha-
sised a number of categories of people, such as women and children, who were
sacrosanct, contemporary jihad theory states that participation in the mechanisms
of modern states confers upon their citizens responsibility for the actions of their
governments because of their voting and payment of taxes. If someone partici-
pates in these activities, then they are legitimate targets for reprisals in response
to the actions of their government. Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries
and are killed because of martyrdom operations should not have been there in the
first place, and are often labelled as apostates on the basis of the argument that
they are contributing to or supporting an infidel regime which is oppressing
the Muslims in other places in the world. And of course the Algerian anti-
governmental jihad had already developed the argument that the families of
apostates are fair game as well.
However, radical Muslim groups in Iraq have been willing to develop other
extreme tactics, such as beheading,31 kidnapping32 and the mutilation of bodies.33
Each one of these types of tactics has been discussed, usually on-line, and then
carried out on the field. Al-Zarqawi pioneered the extensive use of beheading via
the internet as a means by which the Iraqi jihad could be publicised, and non-
Muslims (and apostates) terrorised. However, just as with other controversial
tactics used by jihadis, beheading eventually has led to bad publicity for them,
and has been largely abandoned.
With regard to weapons of mass destruction, the principles already laid down
by the discussion on suicide attacks are the basis for approval. The well-known
Saudi radical cleric Nasir al-Fahd penned a fatwa authorising the use of weapons
of mass destruction, again using the mangonel and the tax and voting
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arguments listed above.34 Although the mujahidin in Iraq have attempted to use
chlorine gas in order to magnify the number of casualties, they have found that
utilising gas is difficult and that the numbers of casualties have not justified the
effort. There are also indications that they may have abandoned this tactic,
perhaps under pressure from al-Qa‘ida Central’s leadership, because it further
alienated them from the Sunni Iraqi population whose continued support they
depend upon.
All-in-all, the mujahidin have made a maximum effort to expand and develop
classical jihad theory. However, their success in utilising the new methodologies
has been quite mixed and in some cases negative for them. There is little popular
support among the Muslim community for fighting or killing methods that could
possibly be directed against Muslims, as has all too often been the case in the
recent past. In the end, the mujahidin gain the most political and religious support
when they portray themselves as underdogs who courageously fight against
enemies of the Muslims under tremendous odds. The moment that the mujahidin
turn their violence against Muslims, they begin to lose popularity and ultimately
become marginalised.
Conclusions
Contemporary jihad theory uses all of the same terms as classical jihad theory.
However, the emphasis in contemporary jihad, at least as it is manifested among
radical Muslims, is upon functionality rather than legality. Increasingly, the
discussions concerning jihad are discussions about the nature of authority in
Sunni Islam (after the abolition of the caliphate in 1924). Whereas traditionally
authority in Sunni Islam was held by the ‘ulama, even in matters of jihad, today
few of the ‘ulama are actively members of radical groups. Those few radical
‘ulama are mostly in prison or are far from the field of battle.35 Mujahidin increas-
ingly see themselves as the arbiters of what is right and what is wrong in jihad,
and feel that their position as the staunchest defenders of Islam gives them the
authority that the ‘court’ ‘ulama have abdicated.
For this reason, although radical fighters fight foreign powers (the USA, Israel,
Russia, India, and others), their true target is still the reform of Islam and the
reconstituting of Muslim society. Jihad and the legitimacy it confers upon the
fighter in the eyes of the Muslim world is but one means by which this authority
can be grasped.
As noted above, while the mujahidin have been at the forefront of the develop-
ment of new jihad law, the acceptance of their law is very open to question. Few of
the ‘ulama identify with the mujahidin, and many of their rulings are open to the
accusation that the latter are finding what they want to find in the classical
material, and making exceptions into the rule. For this reason it is questionable
whether the mujahidin in the future will be able to gain the legitimacy of consensus
for their ideas.
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